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LIQUIDATION has been defined as the winding up of a corporation's affairs
by realizing assets, paying debts, and distributing to the stockholders the
balance remaining.' For tax purposes, the term has acquired a more elastic
content. The revenue acts have superimposed upon the general concept a
statutory definition of "liquidation" dividends broad enough to include not
only disbursements in connection with a complete termination of corporate
activity,2 but also certain distributions in redemption of stock which may
occur in the ordinary course of corporate existence. "Liquidation" may be
effected by a series of distributions, as well as by a single disbursement of
corporate assets. In view of the various forms of liquidation envisaged by
the statutesS3-some of them ambiguous enough in character to admit con-
fusion with other transactions subject to different taxable incidents-it is not
surprising that the administration of the liquidation sections has given rise
to perplexing and controversial tax problems.4
At the outset, the framing of the various statutory provisions provoked
controversy as to the proper theory upon which to proceed in taxing stock-
holders on the receipt of liquidation distributions. From the viewpoint of
the stockholder, the exchange of his stock in the liquidating corporation for
a pro tanto share of the corporate assets has all the characteristics of an
outright sale; in the place of an investment in a going concern the stock-
holder after the final distribution has cash or its equivalent in other property.
Arguably, therefore, tax liability should be determined by the method applied
to the disposition of any other capital asset-by a comparison of the cost or
1. See C. M. Menzies, 34 B. T. A. 163, 168 (1936); see also W. E. Guild, 19
B. T.A. 1186, 1202 (1930).
2. The liquidation provisions have also been held applicable to the complete
liquidation of an association, which is treated for tax purposes as a corporation. Tyrrell
v. Commissioner, 91 F. (2d) 500 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937) ; Pierce Oil Corporation, 32 B. T. A.
403 (1935). This is not true in the case of an ordinary trust, which is not regarded
as an "association" within the revenue laws. Allen v. Commissioner, 49 F. (2d) 716
(C.C. A. 2d, 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 655 (1931). Compare the situation where
the corpus of the trust consists of securities in a dissolving corporation. Letts v.
Commissioner, 84 F. (2d) 760 (C. C.A. 9th, 1936); McNaghten v. United States,
17 F. Supp. 509 (Ct. Cl. 1937).
3. While liquidation distributions normally effect a partial or complete extinguish-
ment of the stockholder's investment in the corporation, if the liquidation occurs in
connection with a reorganization, the stockholder typically retains an interest in a going
concern. Certain liquidation distributions in this latter category have been separately
grouped as non-taxable transactions within the reorganization sections of the various
acts; no attempt will be made here to discuss them. See 2 PAUL AND MEaRTES, TH1E
LAW or FEERAL INcO mE TAXATION (1934) § 17.47 et seq.
4. For a general discussion of liquidation distributions, see I PAUL AND MERTENS,
op. cit. supra note 3, § 8.85 et seq.
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other basis of the stock with total receipts in liquidation.5 On the other hand,
a liquidation disbursement may and usually does consist, at least in part, of
the accumulated earnings and profits of the corporation; to this extent, the
liquidation distribution might well be subjected to the same tax incidents as
an ordinary dividend." Treatment of liquidation distributions under the
various revenue acts reflects a vacillation between these attitudes, although
the latest acts appear finally to have accepted the analogy of a sale. In any
event, an historical survey of the liquidation sections is valuable, not only
as a background for the latest scheme of taxation, but also, in view of the
long life span of tax cases, as a matter of contemporary importance to tax-
payers.
The earlier statutes made no specific mention of liquidating dividends, so
that their taxability was necessarily dependent upon construction of general
provisions.7 The 1918 Act while defining "dividends" as any distribution
by a corporation out of earnings accrued since 1913, added a separate stipu-
lation that amounts distributed in the liquidation of a corporation should be
treated as payment in exchange for the stock, and gains realized were to
be taxed to the recipient in the same fashion as were other gains from the
disposal of capital assets.8 Although "partial liquidation" vras not specifically
mentioned, the provision was held to cover this situation,9 so that in all cases
the excess of liquidation receipts over basis of the stock was subjected to
both normal tax and surtax under the capital gains sections of the 1918 act.10
The Act of 1921 defined dividends as before but dropped the specific pro-
vision as to liquidation distributions. It provided that any distribution by
a corporation to its shareholders other than out of earnings accumulated
before or after February 28, 1913, should be "applied against and reduce"
5. See Magill, Income Tax Liability of Dividends in Liquidation (1925) 23 Micii.
L. Ray. 565, 566-567; SEN. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924) p. 11.
6. Magill, supra note 5, at 567-568.
7. Section B of the Act of 1913 [38 STAT. 167] included in income gains derived
from "dividends" but failed to define the term. In interpreting the Act, the Supreme
Court indicated that liquidation distributions were not within the meaning of the term.
Lynch v. Homby, 247 U. S. 339 (1918); cf. Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U. S. 221 (1918).
The Acts of 1916 and 1917 made "dividends" taxable as income and defined the term
broadly to include any distribution by a corporation out of its earnings accrued since
1913. Section 2(a), 39 STAT. 757 (1916) ; §§ 1200, 1211, 40 STAT. 329, 337-338 (1917).
Under this language distributions in liquidation were held taxable to the extent of
post-1913 earnings as ordinary dividends. James Dobson, 1 B.T. A. 1032 (1925);
see also A. B. Nickey & Sons, 3 B. T. A. 173 (1925).
8. Section 201(c), 40 STAT. 1059 (1918).
9. Tucker v. Alexander, 25 F. (2d) 425 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928), cert. denied, 278
U. S. 619 (1928).
10. Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U. S. 233 (1928); Canal-Commercial Trust &
Savings Bank v. Commissioner, 63 F. (2d) 619 (C. C.A. 5th, 1933), cert. denied, 290
U.S. 628 (1933): Langstaff v. Lucas, 9 F. (2d) 691 (D. Ky. 1925), aff'd wtithout
opinion, 13 F. (2d) 1022 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 721 (1926).
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the cost basis of the stock for purposes of computing gain or loss on its sub.
sequent disposition." As applied by the courts, the Act was interpreted to
mean that all post-1913 earnings received by stockholders through liquidation
disbursements were subject to the surtax, while capital gain or loss on the
stock was to be computed by subtracting the cost basis from the total of all
other proceeds in liquidation.12 The 1924 Act returned to the theory of the
1918 Statute, but spelled out the provisions of the latter in greater detail. 3
By reference to another section of the Act, certain liquidations in the course
of reorganization were exempted from the tax liability of ordinary distri-
butions in liquidation.1" Finally, the Act inferentially permitted individual
shareholders at their option to treat gains from liquidating dividends as
capital gains--taxable at the flat rate of 12/% in lieu of normal and surtax1"
-.-since the retirement of shares was treated as a sale of the stock, and gain
from the sale of capital assets was by definition a capital gain. Substantially
the same provisions were carried into the Acts of 1926,16 1928 1T and 1932.3
The 1934 Act introduced a change in the method of taxing capital gains,
under which the percentage of total gain subject to normal and surtax was
reduced in accordance with the number of years the taxpayer 1" had held
the asset.20 But gains realized in connection with distributions in liquidation
were expressly excluded from the benefit of the new section, whereas losses
11. Section 201(c), 42 STAT. 228 (1921).
12. Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F. (2d) 931 (C. C.A. Ad, 1932) cert. denied,
287 U. S, 667 (1932). But see U. S. Treas. Reg. 62, Art. 1545; 1 PAuL AN Minrncs,
puprq note 3, 421, n, 63. The stockholder might realize both a taxable gain and deductible
loss on the same transaction. Eric A. Pearson, 16 B. T. A. 1405 (1929); Haystone
Securities Corporation, 19 B.T.A. 954 (1930).
13. Section 201(g), 43 STAT. 255 (1924). Partial liquidation was specifically defined
so as to include "distributions by a corporation in complete cancellation of a part of
its stock or one of a series in complete cancellation of all or a portion of its stock."
14. Section 201(c), 43 STAT. 255 (1924); see note 3, supra.
15. Section 208(b), 43 STAT. 263 (1924). The stockholder retained this option
through the Act of 1932. Section 208(b) of the Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 20; § 101(a)
of the Act of 1928, 45 STAT. 811; § 101(a) of the Act of 1932, 47 STAT. 191; see Mary
S. Childs, 35 B.T.A. 1125 (1937). Section 206(b) of the 1921 Statute [42 STAT,
2331 also confers the option on any taxpayer deriving a capital net gain, but since under
Section 201(a) and (c) [42 STAT. 228) the liquidation transaction is apparently not
treated as a sale or exchange of the stock, the privilege should not apply. The rule
is otherwise in the case of bond redemption; gain to the bondholder from such a trans-
action is ordinary income. See John H. Watson, Jr., 27 B. T. A. 463, 465 (1932).
16. Section 201(c), (h), 44 STAT. 11 (1926).
17. Section 201(c), (h), 45 STAT. 822-23 (1928).
18. Section 115(c), (h), 47 STAT. 204 (1932).
19. The percentage limitations only apply in the case of individual taxpayers. 48
STAT. 714, 26 U. S. C. § 101(c) (1934).
20. 48 STAT. 714, 26 U. S. C. § 101(a) (1934). The percentage of loss which
might be recognized was arrived at in the same way. Ibid.
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so incurred were subjected to the percentage limitations.2 ' As a result, stock-
holders resorted to the practice of selling corporate securities immediately
prior to liquidation in order to secure the benefit of the holding period. The
Revenue Act of 1936 partially obviated the necessity of this procedure by
applying the percentage provisions of the Act to gains as well as losses from
a c6mplete corporate liquidation;2 gains from "partial liquidation," how-
ever, remained subject in full to normal and surtax.
Section 115(c) of the 1936 Act provides with respect to distributions in
liquidation as follows:
"(c) Distributions in Liquidation. Amounts distributed in com-
plete liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in full payment
in exchange for the stock, and amounts distributed in partial liquida-
tion of a corporation shall be treated as in part or full payment in
exchange for the stock. The gain or loss to the distributee resulting
from such exchange shall be determined under Section 111 [pro-
viding that gain or loss is the difference between the amounts realized
and the adjusted basis], but shall be recognized only to the extent
provided in Section 112 [the tax-free reorganization section]. Despite
the provisions of Section 117(a) [providing for percentage limita-
tions on the recognition of capital gain or loss], 100 per centum of
the gain so recognized shall be taken into account in computing net
income, except in the case of amounts distributed in complete liquid-
ation of a corporation. For the purpose of the preceding sentence,
'complete liquidation' includes any one of a series of distributions
made by a corporation in complete cancellation or redemption of all
its stock in accordance with a bona fide plan of liquidation and under
which the transfer of the property under the liquidation is to be
completed within a time specified in the plan, not exceeding two
21. 48 STAT. 711, 26 U.S.C. § 115(c) (1934). After arriving at his deductible
loss, the shareholder is allowed as a deduction from gross income only that part of
the loss which does not exceed his gains from sales or exchanges of capital assets,
plus $2000; 48 STAT. 715, 26 U. S. C. § 101(d) (1934); 49 STAT. 1692, 26 U. S. C. A.
§ 101(d) (Supp. 1937) ; this probably includes gains from other distributions in liquida-
tion. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 115-5, example (3); H. I. REP. No. 704, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) p. 29, case 3. But cf., 1 PAUL AND MMrnTS, op. Cit. sPra
note 3, § 8.88. Compare the provision of the 1932 Act. Section 23(r)(1), 47 STAT.
183 (1932); see Chester N. Weaver Co., 35 B.T.A. 514 (1937).
22. 49 STAT. 1687 (1936), 26 U.S.C.A §115(c) (Supp. 1937). The other new
provision of the 1936 Act, embodying an attempt to encourage the elimination of hold-
ing companies, permits the complete liquidation of a subsidiary corporation, under
cerl'ain conditions, without tax liability to the parent. 49 STAT. 1679 (1936), 26
U. S. C. A. § 112(b) (6) (Supp. 1937). See Johnson, Tax-free Liquidalion: Loophole
and Trap (1937) 15 TAx MAG. 3. Under earlier acts a parent corporation might
realize gain or loss from the liquidation of a subsidiary. Burnet v. Aluminum Goods
Mfg. Co., 287 U. S. 544 (1933); Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation v. United States,
13 F. Supp. 633 (Ct. of Cl. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 686 (1936); see Comment
(1934) 47 HARv. L. RE. 1209, 1283 et seq.
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years from the close of the taxable year during which is made the
first of the series of distributions under the plan. In the case of
amounts distributed (whether before January 1, 1934, or on or after
such date) in partial liquidation (other than a distribution within the
provisions of subsection (h) of this section of stock or securities in
connection with a reorganization) the part of such distribution which
is properly chargeable to capital account shall not be considered a
distribution of earnings or profits."' 23
Section 115(i) of the 1936 Act 24 defines "partial liquidation" as follows:
"(i) Definition of Partial Liquidation. As used in this Section the
term 'amounts distributed in partial liquidation' means a distribution
by a corporation in complete cancellation or redemption of a part of
its stock, or one of a series of distributions in complete cancellation
or redemption of all or a portion of its stock."
It is clear that under the present Act several types of liquidation transac-
tions are contemplated. Distributions to stockholders in "complete liquida-
tion" of a corporation may take the shape of 1) a single disbursement of
all the corporate assets, or 2) a series of corporate distributions in complete
cancellation or redemption of all the stock under a bona fide plan of liquida-
tion, to be completed within a specified time not exceeding three years.
Distributions in "partial. liquidation" may consist of 1) one or more of a
series of distributions in complete cancellation or redemption of all the
corporate stock, but without a specified time limit, or 2) one or more of
a series of distributions, similarly unqualified as to time, in complete can-
cellation or redemption of a part of the corporate stock, or finally 3) a
single disbursement in complete cancellation or redemption of a part of the
corporation's stock.
In determining the impingement of the revenue acts upon transactions
held to fall within the scope of the liquidation sections, the courts found
little difficulty with the preliminary question of whether such distributiuns
constituted "income" taxable to the recipients. Where cash was received
the case was clear, but where the assets of the corporation were turned over
in kind to the stockholders who thereafter continued the business individually
or under the partnership laws, the objection was raised that no gain or loss
had been realized since the transaction involved merely a change in the
form of control over the property. This contention was rejected almost
unanimously by the courts-the conspicuous changes in the form of the
23. The 1937 Act amended the Act of 1936 by adding another sentence to section
115(c), withholding application of the percentage limitations to gains from the com-
plete liquidation 'of foreign personal holding companies, except upon the fulfillment
of certain conditions. 50 STAT. 825, 26 U. S. C. A. § 115(c) (Stpp, 1937).
24. 49 STAT. 1689 (1936), 26 U.S.C.A. § 115(i) (Supp. 1937).
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stockholders' investment being held sufficient to justify a finding that gain
or loss had been realized.25
Most controversy over application oJf the liquidation sections has resulted
from the difficulty of distinguishing a distribution in liquidation from a num-
ber of other transactions, accompanied by different tax incidents.20  The
similarity, for instance, between "ordinary" dividends, defined as any dis-
tribution of post-1913 "earnings or profits," and "liquidating" dividends which
may also entail the distribution of earnings or profits, has been responsible
for much litigation-differences in the taxable effects of the two types of
distribution supplying the necessary incentive. The question of whether a
given distribution falls within one category or the other typically arises in
connection with a distribution unaccompanied by any cancellation or redemp-
tion of stock. The distribution, if largely or entirely composed of "earnings
or profits," may plausibly be interpreted under the recent acts as either an
"ordinary" dividend or one of the initial distributions of a series intended
to be "in complete cancellation or redemption of all or a portion of the
corporate stock." The question of intent in each case is one of fact.-" It is
therefore futile to attempt more than an enumeration of some of the factors
which have influenced the Board and courts in their decisions.
As a preliminary consideration, it should be noted that there has been some
confusion in the cases as to the necessity for a corporation actually to be in
liquidation in the sense of winding up its affairs, before there can be a dis-
tribution in "partial liquidation."28 The position that such evidence is neces-
sary no longer seems warranted by statutory definition,O except in the case
25. Langstaff v. Lucas. 9 F. (2d) 691 (D. Ky. 1925), aff'd uithout opinion, 13 F.
(2d) 1022 (C.C.A. 6th, 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 721 (1930); Jemison v. Com-
missioner, 45 F. (2d) 4 (C. C. A. 5th. 1926); see MAGiLL, TA X m.u Ihco (1936)
114-115. But cf. Hinkel v. Motter, 39 F. (2d) 159 (D. Kan. 1930), appeal dismi ssed,
42 F. (2d) 1018 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930). The British courts, in line with their tendency
not to consider capital gains income, have held that no taxable income is realized from
a distribution in liquidation. See Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Burrell, [1924]
2 K. B. 52. 73-74; 'MAGILL, supra at 70-90, 114, n. 168.
26. It may be difficult at times to distinguish a corporate loan to the st, ckholder
from a distribution in liquidation [Sam Weisberger, 29 B. T. A. 83 (1933) ; cf. Anketell
Lumber & Coal Co. v. United States, I F. Supp. 724 (Ct. Cl. 1932)), as well as from
a dividend. 1 PAUL AND NIEMaFxs, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 8.26, 8.34. Another
ambiguous situation may be created by the "sale" of the corpnrate assets to stoekholders.
If the "sale" appears to be merely a step in the process ,. lituidation, it is disregarded.
Cook v. United States. 3 F. Supp. 47 (Ct. of Cl. 1933) Aaron Pomeranz, 11 B.T. A.
507 (1928); cf. Oscar G. Joseph, 32 B.T.A. 1192 (1935). But cC. M. .1Menzies,
34 B.T.A. 163 (1936). In this co'nnection. the doctrine of a "bargain sale" [see
MACILL, TAXABLF INCOMIE (1936) 119 et seq.] is sometimes relied up.n by a liquidation
distributee. France Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F. (2d) 917 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937).
27. See Helvering v. Edison Securities Corporation, 78 F. (2d) 85, 87 (C. C.A.
4th, 1935) ; Fred T. Wood, 27 B. T. A. 162, 167 (1932).
28. See I PAUL AND MErTENs, supra note 3, § 8.98.
29. In every revenue act since the Act of 1921, "partial liquidation" has been defined
without reference to the necessity of a winding up of corporate business. Section 201(g),
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of partial liquidations which contemplate complete corporate termination
through the cancellation or redemption of all the corporate stock. Most of
the litigation, however, has involved situations where the disputed distri-
bution was actually followed by corporate dissolution, and here evidence of
an intent to wind up, in the shape of any formal step taken by the stock-
holders or directors prior to the distribution is clearly material. 30 In fact,
since a resolution by the stockholders to dissolve is a requisite preliminary
step in the dissolution of a corporation, any dividend declared before the
first official action will generally be regarded as not in liquidation.3 1 But
the absence of formal action is not conclusive.32 Conversely, the inference
arising from a stockholders' resolution to liquidate has been held rebutted
where the corporation subsequently continued to operate in a normal fashion,
kept its capital intact and renewed its charter. s That the dividend was in
furtherance of a winding-up may also be inferred from such facts as a prior
sale of all assets,84 or fulfillment of the purposes for which the corporation
was organized. 5 Other factors may point to a liquidating rather than an
ordinary dividend, whether or not the distribution was one of a series in
contemplation of actual corporate termination. The fact, for instance, that
a given distribution is unusual in amount or time3 " or is paid "entirely out-
side of the due course of business of the corporation""" would always 88 appear
to indicate a liquidation distribution. 9
43 STAT. 255 (1924); §201(h), 44 STAT. 11 (1926); §201(h), 45 STAT. 823 (1928);
§115(h), 47 STAT. 204 (1932); 48 STAT. 712, 26 U.S.C. § 115(1) (1934); 49 STAT.
1689 (1936), 26 U.S.C.A. §115(i) (Supp. 1937). See Commissioner v. Quackenbos,
78 F. (2d) 156 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935). Under the 1918 Act, there 9a more basis for
the attitude that evidence of winding up was always necessary, in view of the connotation
of the term "liquidation" and the absence of defin'ition in the Act. Cf. E. G. Perry,
9 B.T.A. 796 (1927); W. E. Guild, 19 B.T.A. 1186 (1930).
30. See S. B. Dandridge, 11 B. T. A. 421, 427 (1928)."
31. Estate of Rudolph F. Rabe, 25 B.T.A. 1242 (1932); see James P. Goseett,
22 B. T. A. 1279, 1285-1286 (1931), aff'd sub. nora. Gossett v. Commissioner, 59 F. (2d)
365 (C. C.A. 4th, 1932), ,ehebaing denied, 60 F. (2d) 484 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
32. Holmby Corporation v. Commissioner, 83 F. (2d) 548 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936);
W. F. Kennerner, 35 B.T.A. 415 (1937).
33. W. E. Guild, 19 B.T.A. 1186 (1930).
34. Tootle v. Commissioner, 58 F. (2d) 576 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); Edward S.
Bacharach, 29 B. T. A. 282 (1933); William H. Monk, Jr., 29 B. T. A. 556 (1933).
35. Fred T. Wood, 27 B. T. A. 162 (1932); Frelmont Realty Corporation, 29
B. T.A. 181 (1933).
36. Canal-Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v. Commissioner, 63 F. (2d) 619
(C. C.A. 5th, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 628 (1933); Edward S. Bacharach, 29
B. T. A. 282 (1933). But cf. Helvering v. Edison Securities Corp., 78 F. (2d) 85
(C. C.A. 4th, 1935).
37. See Gossett v. Commissioner, 59 F. (2d) 365, 367 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932), rehearing
denied, 60 F. (2d) 484 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
38. However, the cases cited in notes 36 and 37, supra. involved situations where
actual corporate termination ensued.
39. To establish the opposite conclusion, reliance has sometimes been placed, with-
out success, on arguments that the distribution was entirely from earnings [Canal-
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Discussion thus far has been directed to situations where the questioned
distribution, as a factual matter, preceded any "cancellation or redemption"
of stock. But as defined in the acts, every distribution in partial liquidation
miust involve a redemption or cancellation of stock'- a requirement not
attaching in the case of complete liquidations effected in a single transac-
tion. Under the 1936 Act a series of distributions in complete liquidation
also must include cancellation or redemption. It therefore seems important
to determine the meaning of the phrase "cancellation or redemption." Con-
ceivably, the disjunctive "or" might be used to express either a flatly ad-
versative relation between the words, or an alternative connection, in the
sense, merely, that while the thought content of the two words was similar,
the form of the transactions expressed was different. The courts seem to
have adopted the former interpretation, holding that the words have different
meanings, and their use conveys the idea that stock may be "redeemed"
without being cancelled; that is, to "redeem" means simply to "repurchase"
without connation of stock retirement.41 Accordingly, the purchase by a
corporation of its own shares has been held to constitute a distribution in
partial liquidation, even though the shares were kept alive in the treasury
and subsequently re-issued as a stock dividend.2 The courts have also im-
parted to the phrase "redemption or cancellation" a construction broad enough
Commercial Trust and Savings Bank v. Commissioner, 63 F. (2d) 619 (C C A. 5th,
1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 628 (1933)], that no shares were surrendered [James P.
Gossett, 22 B.T.A. 1279 (1931), aff'd sub. noma. Gossett v. Commissioner, 59 F. (Zd)
365 (C.C.A. 4th, 1932), rehearing dencd, 60 F. (2d) 484 (C. CA. 4th, 1932);
William 1,. Monk, Jr., _9 B.T.A. 556 (1933)], or that the corporation was never
actually dissolved or was later revived. Canaday v. Commissioner, 76 F. (Zd) 278
(C. C. A. 3d, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 612 (1935); IV. F. Kennemer, 35 B.T.A.
415 (1937). It is also immaterial that the corporation could not under state law legally
make distributions in liquidation. Tootle v. Commissioner, 58 F. (2d) 576 (C. C.A.
8th, 1932).
40. Rosenbloom Finance Corporation, 24 B.T.A. 763 (1931). Distributions by
concerns engaged in "wasting asset" industries, though reflecting e.xhaustion of capital
investment, are not treated as liquidation transactions unless they involve the redemption
of stock or otherwise fulfill the statutory definition. The practice is to set up "depletion
reserves" in recognition of asset reduction. See Mo~coN-LRY, FmNcEAL HANDEoo=
(2d ed., 1933) 383-384. Distributions from capital 'reserves of this character based
on cost or farch 1, 1913 value of the property, if not within the definition of liquidation
distributions, apply against and reduce the basis of the stock, and any excess is taxable
as a capital gain. 49 STAT. 1688 (1936), 26 U. S. C A. § 115(d) (Supp. 1937); U. S.
Treas. Reg. 96, Art. 115-6: see 1 PAUL AND MEaRm' s, supra note 3, § 8.58 ct seq. But
compare the rule as to a distribution from a depletion reserve based on "discovery
value." U. S. Treas. Reg. 96, Art. 11546.
41. James D. Robinson, 27 B. T. A. 1018 (1933), aff'd .ub. nonm. Robinson v. Com-
missioner, 69 F. (2d) 972 (C. C.A. 5th, 1934). But cf. Louis Rorimer, 27 B.T.A.
871, 878-879 (1933).
42. John B. Stewart, 29 B. T. A. 809 (1934).
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to include a reduction in the face value of shares without diminution of their
number.4
3
The process of partial liquidation is referred to in the statute as "dis-
tribution."4 Use of this term raises the further question of the extent to
which the term "distribution," which seems to connote a pro rata division
among a class, qualifies the mere fact of a "redemption" accompanied by
the expenditure of corporate funds. Thus, where there is no indication of
actual corporate termination, the problem is one of determining which of
the various methods of reducing capital stock, requiring the disbursement
of funds, amounts to a "distribution" in cancellation or redemption of stock
within the definition of a "partial liquidation," rather than an ordinary capital
transaction, governed by the capital gains provisions of the acts. Methods
of reducing capital stock include the "redemption" of preferred or other
special stock (often from a sinking fund) in accordance with the provisions
of issuance; and purchase by a corporation of its stock on the open market,
or under an offer to buy pro rata from stockholders at a given price. The
corporation may also buy its stock, after requesting tenders of a certain
number of shares at a fixed price, from the first stockholders to accept the
offer.45 To point the question, if a corporation takes advantage of depression
prices to reduce its capital stock liability by acquiring shares on the market,
does each transaction of purchase amount to a liquidation distribution in
redemption of stock? The dictionary definition of "distribute"-"to divide
among several or many, to deal out, apportion, allot'--has been cited to
support the conclusion that only a redemption involving a pro rata appor-
tionment of assets among stockholders comes within the liquidation provi-
sions.46 On the other hand, the Treasury Regulations state that a complete
cancellation or redemption of a part of the corporate stock may be accom-
plished by the complete retirement of any part of the stock, "whether or
not pro rata among the shareholders." 4 7
But few cases have arisen under the liquidation sections where the redemp-
tion has been other than pro rata among the stockholders of the particular
class affected. And.it seems likely that the criteria of pro rata purchase and
a uniform price will be influential in determining whether or not the liquida-
tion provisions cover a given transaction.48 Other considerations, of course,
43. Commissioner v. Straub, 76 F. (2d) 388 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1935). But cf. John B.
Stewart, 29 B.T.A. 809, at 813 (1934).
44. See note 24, supra, and text.
45. See MoNTGoMmay, op. cit. supra note 40, 806-808.
46. See James D. Robinson, 27 B. T. A. 1018, 1021-1022 (1933), aff'd sub. nom.
Robinson v. Commissioner, 69 F. (2d) 972 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Smith, dissenting,
in John B. Stewart, 29 B.T.A. 809, 816 (1934). The distribution need not be in
accordance with stock ownership if the stockholders agree otherwise. Burnett v.
United States, 58 F. (2d) 860 (Ct. Cl. 1932).
47. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 115-5.
48. When stock was nt purchased pro rata nor at a uniform price, the transaction
was apparently viewed as one of purchase rather than as a liquidation transaction, even
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may qualify the decision-as, for example, the fact that a relatively large
part of the particular class of stock involved has been acquired 40 or a rela-
tively large number of shareholders affected.r0 At any rate, the extreme
situations seem dear: where a corporation redeems an entire issue of pre-
ferred stock at the price fixed on issuance, a "partial liquidation" results.
at least so far as the present question is concerned.51 On the other hand,
where a large corporation purchases a few shares from a single stockholder 2
or deals on the market in its stock, buying and selling at varying pricesP
the transactions appear not to be within the purview of the liquidation sec-
tions; and gain or loss to the stockholders should be governed by the capital
gains provisions of the acts. It is between these extremes that the line may
be hazy. Under the earlier acts, the problem vas chiefly important in relation
to the question of the "source" of a given liquidation distribution." But
under the 1934 and 1936 acts the problem has acquired new significanceF
for if the stockholder can establish the case as one involving an ordinary
capital transaction, he will be entitled to the percentage limitations on capital
though the corporation acquired over 40% of its outstanding ockr. But the c= is
not clear. Harry A. Ko-, 26 B. T. A. 1025 (1932).
49. Phelps v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 299 (C CA. 7th, 1931), cert. derred, 235
U. S. 558 (1932) (all shares redeemed at a uniform price, except 300 of the 2550 held
by one shareholder).
50. Phelps v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 289 (C. .A. 7th, 1931), cert. der ed,
288 U. S. 558 (1932); John B. Stewart, 29 B.T.A. 809 (1934).
51. Commissioner v. Brown, 69 F. (2d) 602 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934), cert. deried,
293 U. S. 570 (1934). The redemption might be treated as the distribution of a taxable
dividend, of course, rather than as a liquidation distribution, if it was "at such time
and in such manner" as to make it the equivalent of an ordinary dividend. See infra,
p. 1157. This might also be true even if the transaction were one of purchass. See
H. F. Asmussen, 36 B.T.A. No. 144 (1937).
52. See Phelps v. Comm., 54 F. (2d) 2&9, 292 (C.C.A. 7th, 1931), cemi. dened,
285 U.S. 558 (1932).
53. H. F. Asmussen, 36 B. T. A. No. 144 (1937) ; see John B. Stewart, 29 B. T. A.
809, 814 (1934).
54. Subsequent to the closing of all questions as to the taxability of a distribution
in liquidation, it has sometimes been necessary to re-examine the distribution and
ascertain the funds from which it was derived, for the purpose of determining the taxa-
bility of more recent corporate disbursements. Cf. 'John B. Stewart, 29 B. T. A. 809
(1934); August Horrman, 34 B. T. A. 1178 (1936). To defeat the contention that
every partial liquidation distribution must be considered a disbursement of earnings
under the statutory presumption, the revenue laws since 1924 have provided that the
part of such distribution "properly chargeable' to "capital account" should not be con-
sidered a distribution of earnings. The Supreme Court held that "capital account"
consists not only of capital stock but also of pre-1913 earnings and increase in property-
value. Foster v. United States, 5 U. S. L. WscE 614 (Jan. 31, 1938).
55. Aside from the questions of "source" [see note 54, supra], the question had
previously been important only under statutes such as the 1921 Act which did not
apply the analogy of a sale to liquidation distributions. Phelps v. Comm., 54 F. (2d)
289 (C.C.A. 7th, 1931), cert. denied, 285 U. S. 558 (1932).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
gains, while if the transaction is one in partial liquidation, he will be taxed
in full on his gain.
Even in cases where stock is redeemed pro rata so that there is clearly
a "distribution," there is still considerable opportunity for litigation over the
question of whether the distribution constitutes a liquidating dividend or
an ordinary dividend. Section 115(g) of the 1936 Act"6 provides: "If a
corporation cancels or redeems its stock (whether or not such stock was
issued as a stock dividend) at such time and in such manner as to make the
distribution and cancellation or redemption in whole or in part essentially
equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount so distributed
in redemption or cancellation of the stock, to the extent that it represents
a distribution of earnings or profits accumulated after February 28, 1913,
shall be treated as a taxable dividend." This provision originated in the 1921
Act " as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Eisner v. MacosberO
that certain stock dividends were not taxable as income within the 16th
Amendment. The Act of 1921 eliminated stock dividends from the category
of taxable income but sought to prevent stockholders from employing the
device of issuance of a stock dividend followed closely by redemption to
escape a high surtax on ordinary dividends. The Act provided that if after
the issuance of a stock dividend the corporation cancelled or redeemed its
stock "in such time and in such manner" as to make the transaction essen-
tially equivalent to the distribution of an ordinary dividend, the distribution
was to be treated as such to the extent of post-1913 earnings. The 1924 Act
tightened the section by including the case where the redemption of stock
was followed by a stock dividend,59 and the 1926 Act °0 brought it into its
present form by extending its application to a distribution in redemption of
stock, whether the stock was issued as a dividend or not.0 .
56. 49 STAT. 1688 (1936), 26 U.S.C.A. §115(g) (Supp. 1937).
57. Section 201(d), 42 STAT. 228 (1921).
58. 252 U. S. 189 (1920).
59. Section 201(f), 43 STAT. 255 (1924). The need for this amendment was
exemplified in John Stewart Bryan, 20 B. T. A. 573 (1930) (shares issued for cash
were redeemed, and thereafter the capital structure of the company was increased by the
issuance as a stock dividend of the very shares previously redeemed).
60. Section 201(g), 44 STAT. 11 (1926). Substantially the same provision was
contained in subsequent acts. Section 115(g), 45 STAT. 822 (1928) ; § 115(g), 47 STAT.
204 (1932); 48 STAT. 712 (1934), 26 U.S.C. § 115(g) (1934) ; 49 STAT. 1688 (1936),
26 U. S. C. A. § 115(g) (Supp. 1937). For a historical discussion of the provision in
the early acts, see Henry B. Babson, 27 B. T. A. 859 (1933), aff'd sub. nom. Commis-
sioner v. Babson, 70 F. (2d) 304 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934), cert. den., 293 U. S. 571 (1934) ;
generally, see I PAUL AND MRTEs, op. cit. supro note 3, § 8.105 et seq.; Comment
(1936) 49 HAEv. L. REv. 1344.
61. The provision does not apply to the redemption of stock from corporate share-
holders exempt from tax upon dividends received, since under such circumstances the
redemption could not constitute the equivalent of a "taxable' dividend. Salt Lake
Hardware Co., 27 B. T. A. 482 (1932) ; Palmetto Quarries Co., 30 B. T. A. 544 (1934).
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Whether a given distribution of corporate earnings by redemption or
cancellation has occurred "at such time and in such manner" as to be the
equivalent of an ordinary dividend is again a question of factca varying with
the individual case.63 Certain tests, however, are generally influential in
reaching a decision." Since the provision was originally aimed at tax evasion
through the medium of a stock dividend, it has been natural that a relation-
ship between the issuance and redemption of stock evidencing a preconceived
and continuing plan to distribute earnings free from tax has overshadowed
other factors in measuring the applicability of the section.c3 Thus, where
at the time of the stock dividend the corporation simultaneously offered to
purchase 20%o of the issue for cash, the section clearly appliedc" In more
ambiguous situations, evidence of a preconceived plan has been found in
the consistent practice of a corporation to issue and redeem stock dividendso,
or in the fact that the period of time between issuance and redemption was
short.6 It has also been considered suspicious that few payments of cash
dividends were ever made,69 and that at the time the stock dividend was
declared the corporation had ample funds on hand to pay the dividend in
cash.70 On the other hand, existence of a plan to evade taxes can always
The exemption extended to most dividend distributions, and applied in some form through
the 1934 Act. Section 234(a) (6), 42 STAT. 255 (1921); §234(a) (6), 43 STAT. 234
(1924) ; §234(a) (6), 44 STAT. 42 (1926) ; §23(p), 45 STAT. E01-02 (1928) ; §23(p),
47 STAT. 182 (1932); 48 STAT. 690-691, 26 U.S.C. §23(p) (1934). However, under
the 1936 Act a corporate stockholder is subject to tax on at least 155o of every dividend
received from another corporation [49 STAT. 1664 (1936), 26 U.S. C.A. § 26(b) (Supp.
1937)], and the rationale may no longer be applicable.
62. Commissioner v. Babson, 70 F. (2d) 304 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934), cert. denied, 293
U. S. 571 (1934) ; Randolph v. Comm., 76 F. (2d) 472 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
63. McGuire v. Commissioner, 84 F. (2d) 431 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) cert. den fd,
299 U. S. 591 (1936); see Albert T. Perkins, 36 B.T.A. No. 132 (1937).
64. For an enumeration of criteria, see J. Natwick, 36 B. T. A. No. 143 (1937);
I. F. Asmussen, 36 B.T.A. No. 144 (1937).
65. Leopold Adler, 30 B. T. A. 897 (1934) ; see Commissioner v. Cordingley, 78 F.
(2d) 118, 120 (C. C.A. 1st, 1935); Pearl B. Brown, 26 B.T.A. 901, (1932), aff'd ub.
nom. Commissioner v. Brown, 69 F. (2d) 602 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934), cert. dened, 293
U. S. 570 (1934).
66. Robinson v. Commissioner, 69 F. (2d) 972 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934). However, the
customary inclusion in preferred stock issues of provisions for redemption at a certain
time or in a certain manner does not per se indicate a preconceived plan. Alfred A. Laun,
26 B. T.A. 764 (1932); James A. Connelly, 30 B. T. A. 331 (1934).
67. C.A. Goding, 34 B. T. A. 201 (1936).
68. Shelby H. Curlee, 28 B. T. A. 773 (1933), aff'd sub. nom. Randolph v. Com-
missioner, 76 F. (2d) 472 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935); Arthur M. Godwin, 34 B. T. A. 485
(1936); cf. William C. Huntoon, 14 B. T. A. 459 (1928).
69. C. A. Goding, 34 B. T. A. 201 (1936); J. Natwick, 36 B. T. A. No. 143 (1937).
Conversely, regular cash dividend payments are supporting evidence that the redemption
was not the equivalent of an ordinary dividend. Henry B. Babson, 27 B.T.A. 859
(1933), aff'd sub. norn. Commissioner v. Babson, 70 F. (2d) 304 (C. C.A. 7th, 1934),
cert. denied, 293 U. S. 571 (1934); Alfred E. Fuhlage, 32 B. T. A. 222 (1935).
70. Cf. Robert R. Meyer, 27 B. T.A. 44 (1932).
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be rebutted by proof that sound business reasons dictated the alterations in
capital structure 71 - for instance, that the stock dividend was issued pur-
suant to an erroneous business judgment, or that a material change of cir-
cumstances occurred during the period between issuance and redemption
rendering it unnecessary to retain in the business earnings previously thought
essential to operation.72 In the face of a showing of this character, the courts
and Board have usually hesitated to treat the redemption as the equivalent
of an ordinary dividend.
But the existence of a relationship between issuance and redemption is
not the only test.73 The amendment adopted by the 1926 Act, which brings
within the scope of the provision the redemption of shares not issued as a
stock dividend, purports to abolish the distinction between ordinary and
liquidating dividends wherever the device of stock redemption is employed
to make a disbursement essentially equivalent to a normal dividend.74 The
result has been to center attention on the time and manner of the distribu-
tion and redemption and the circumstances surrounding themY The courts
have held that Congress did not intend by the broader provision to tax as
a dividend every liquidation transaction which involved the cash distribution
of earnings,76 but pro rata redemption, 77 the maintenance of an unaltered
capital structure, 8 or the fact that the corporation is closely held"9 are
71. Commissioner v. Champion, 78 F. (2d) 513 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935); Alfred E.
Fuhlage, 32 B. T. A. 222 (1935) ; H. F. Asmussen, 36 B. T. A. No, 144 (1937).
72. See Shelby H. Curled, 28 B. T. A. 773, 780 (1933), aff'd sub. noma. Randolph v.
Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 472 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
73. Hill v. Commissioner, 66 F. (2d) 45 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933); J. Natwick, 36
B. T.A. No. 143 (1937).
74. H. R. REP. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., (Conference Report, 1925) p. 30;
SEN. RE'. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (Committee on Finance, 1925) p. 15; see Hyman
v. Helvering, 71 F. (2d) 342, 343-344 (App. D. C., 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 570
(1934).
75. See Hill v. Commissioner, 66 F. (2d) 45, 47 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
76. Commissioner v. Brown, 69 F. (2d) 602 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934), cert. denied, 293
U. S. 570 (1934); George Rockwood, 31 B. T. A. 927 (1934), a/i'd sub, noin. Commis.
sioner v. Rock-wood, 82 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
77. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 115-9; H. F. Asmussen, 36 B. T. A. No. 144 (1927);
cf. Harry A. Koch, 26 B.T.A. 1025 (1932). But cf. George Rockwood, 31 B.T.A. 927
(1934), aff'd sub. nom. Commissioner v. Rockwood, 82 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
On the other hand, the fact that redemption was not pro rata may not of itself be enough
to contradict equivalence to a taxable dividend. McGuire v. Commissioner, 84 F. (2d)
431 (C.C. A. 7th, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 591 (1936). In fact, the redemption
need not meet all the legal requirements of an ordinary dividend before it can be held
taxable as such. Shelby H. Curlee, 28 B. T. A. 773 (1933), af'd sub. norm. Randolph
v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 472 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935); Leopold Adler, 30 B. T, A.
897 (1934).
78. Hill v. Commissioner, 66 F. (2d) 45 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933); Brown v. Commis-
sioner, 79 F. (2d) 73 (C. C.A. 3d, 1935).
79. Hyman v. Helvering, 71 F. (2d) 342 (App. D. C, 1934), cert. denied, 293
U. S. 570 (1934); Brown v. Commissioner, 79 F. (2d) 73 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935). But
cf. Commissioner v. Ahlborn, 77 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935).
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factors indicating that the transaction comes within the sectiun.60
In any event, the entire problem of when a cancellation or redemption
of stock constitutes the equivalent of a taxable dividend has become less
acute. Statutes previous to the 1936 Act provided broadly that "a stock
dividend shall not be subject to tax."8' But the 1936 Act, taking cognizance
of the fact that only a limited class of stock dividends is constitutionally
exempt from taxation, provides that a distribution of stock made by a cor-
poration to its shareholders is exempt from taxation only to the extent
that "it does not constitute income to the shareholder within the meaning
of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution." 8 2 The effect of the pro-
vision may be to permit the taxation of stock dividends as income except
in the case of common on common, where no preferred is outstandingpm
If a stock dividend is taxed at issuance, its redemption is obviously not an
attempt to distribute earnings free of tax. Therefore, the scope of the section
under the present Act appears to be limited as a practical matter either to
situations where the shares redeemed were not issued as a stock dividend or
to the recently narrowed field involving redemption of exempt stock dividends.
One further caveat must be pointed out. Even if the redemption of stock
is held not to constitute the equivalent of an ordinary dividend, the transaction
may yet fall outside the purview of the liquidation provisions, if an attempt
is made to use the form of a liquidation distribution without the fact in fraud
of the revenue laws. A corporation's affairs, for instance, may not be
manipulated for the benefit of stockholders so as to permit them in con-
venient years to take artificial losses, by means of a distribution in redemp-
tion of stock which is in no sense proportionate to the decrease in shares.84
80. Evidence of actual winding up rebuts this conclusion, of course. Albert T.
Perkins, 36 B. T. A. No. 132 (1937). But the mere absence of such evidence is entirely
immaterial in establishing equivalence to a taxable dividend, since partial liquidation
has no necessary relation to a winding up of the corporation. Commissioner v. Quacl:-
enbos, 78 F. (2d) 156 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935); Salt Lake Hardware Co., 27 B.T.A. 482
(1932). The status of the particular stockholder sought to be taxed is another cir-
cumstance to be weighed in considering the time and manner of redemption. Parker
V. United States, 88 F. (2d) 907 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
81. Section 201(d), 42 STAT. 228 (1921); § 201(f), 43 ST.AT. 255 (1924); §201(f),
44 STAT. 11 (1926); § 115(f), 45 STAT. 822 (1928); §115(f), 47 STAT. 204 (1932);
48 STAT. 712; 26 U.S.C. § 115(f) (1934).
82. 49 STAT. 1688, 26 U.S. C.A. § 115(f) (Supp. 1936); see U. S. Treas. Reg. 94,
Art. 115-7.
83. This was the factual situation of Eisner v. Macomber, where stock dividends
were originally declared non-taxable. 252 U. S. 189 (1920). The receipt of a preferred
stock dividend by a common shareholder where no preferred was outstanding has also
been held exempt from taxation. Alfred A. Loun, 26 B. T. A. 764 (1932); see August
Horrman, 34 B.T.A. 180 (1936). It seems quite probable that the Supreme Court
may distinguish the last situation from that of the Eisner case if the question is ever
presented. See (1938) 38 CoL L REv. 363, 367; (1937) 51 HuA-v. L. Rrv. 702, 706.
84. Hellman v. Helvering, 68 F. (2d) 763 (App. D. C. 1934); Orie R. Kelly, 36
B. T. A. No. 85 (1937). Thus, where a corporation whose sole stockholder had invested
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Assuming, finally, that a given distribution meets all the criteria of a
liquidation disbursement, the stockholder involved is also interested, as a
practical matter, in determining the amount of gain upon which he is taxable
and the date of its receipt for tax purposes. In computing taxable gain,
the amounts" received by a stockholder as liquidation distributions apply
against the basis of his stock, determined in accordance with the rules that
govern any other asset.8 6 In the case of a partial liquidation consisting of
a distribution or series of distributions in redemption of a part of the stock,
no gain is taxable unless and until the "amounts distributed"17 exceed the
basis of so much of the stock as is redeemed. Likewise, where a series of
distributions-whether in "partial liquidation" or "complete liquidation"-
anticipates total corporate termination, no gain is realized by the shareholder
unless and until the amounts disbursed exceed the aggregate cost base of
all his shares.s s The question of basis, however, may prove troublesome in
the case of a series of distributions-which may or may not aim toward
complete liquidation-where in connection with one of the serial distributions
a number of shares are surrendered. Is the amount received to be applied
against the basis of all shares or only those shares surrendered? It has been
held that in a continuing process of complete liquidation it was improper
to treat a single distribution and redemption separately, even though the
transaction if isolated might answer to the statutory description of a partial
liquidation.8 9 But the result seems to be different if it appears that the dis-
$150,000 in the business sustained losses of $26,000, redemption by the corporation of
one-third its $100 par shares for $24,000, did not allow the stockholder to take a loss
of $6,00, calculated on the $50,000 basis of the stock redeemed. Heilman v. Helvering,
wpr. In a close case, there would be some question as to whether the market, par,
or book value of the shares redeemed should be approklmated by the redemption figure.
The last may be the test. Cf. One R. Kelly, 36 B. T. A. No. 85 (1937).
85. Where the distribution is partly or wholly in kind, the fair market value of the
assets received, determined in accordance with the general rules of valuation, is con-
trolling. Book value is not conclusive. Wessel v. United States, 49 F. (2d) 137 (C. C. A.
8th, 1931); see cases cited I PAul AND MERTENs, op. cit. supra note 3, 403-404.
86. For the provisions of the 1936 Act, see 49 STAT. 1682, 26 U. S. C. A. § 113
(Supp. 1937).
87. Use of this phrase in the statutes has led to the conclusion that where no amounts
are distributed in liquidation, the liquidation sections are inapplicable-i.e., no capital
loss can be taken although an ordinary loss may be. Echols v. Commissioner, 61 F.
(2d) 191 (C.C.A. 8th, 1932), (1933) 46 HAnv. L. REv. 529.
88. Lefts v. Commissioner, 84 F. (2d) 760 (C. C.A. 9th, 1936); see Florence M.
Quinn, 35 B. T. A. 412, 414 (1937). But Cf. 1 PAUL AND MERTEms, op. cit. supra note 3,
§ 8.100. Although the installment sales provisions of the acts were clearly directed at
a different type of transaction lid., at § 12.01 et seq.], it might be possible for a stock-
holder who knew in advance his eventual total receipts to bring the liquidation trans-
action within the definitijn of a "casual sale" of "personal property" and report a
percentage of his gain upon receipt of each distribution. See 49 STAT. 1667 (1936),
26 U.S.C.A. § 44(b) (Supp. 1937).
89. Florence M. Quinn, 35 B. T. A. 412 (1937).
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tribution was not incident to a complete liquidation, even though the dis-
bursement exhausted as much as 757 of the company's assets. ° Gain thus
computed is generally recognized for tax purposes at the date of actual
receipt.91
As indicated, most of the litigation has centered around the problem of
distinguishing a liquidation disbursement from an ordinary dividend. The
wide difference under most of the acts in the rates of tax upon liquidating
and ordinary dividends has encouraged taxpayer attempts to swing a given
transaction into one category or the other. For instance, the earlier acts
treated liquidating dividends as a sale of the stock and permitted gain to
be taxed at the flat 12Ya % rate 0 2 while ordinary dividends were taxed
only at surtax rates.93 This arrangement benefitted wealthy shareholders
whose surtax rates exceeded 12327o, since they were permitted to limit
tax liability upon earnings distributed in the form of liquidating dividends
to a levy at the flat rate. On the other hand, it penalized the less well-to-do
shareholder, for where surplus was distributed- as an ordinary dividend to
such taxpayer he was not only exempt from normal tax but would ordinarily
not come within the surtax brackets, while if such distribution was made
to him as part of a liquidating dividend, he would be subject at least to
normal tax on the gain." The 1934 Act, though retaining the sale principle
90. John B. Williams, 28 B. T. A. 1279 (1933).
91. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Blair, 26 F. (2d) 532 (App. D. C.
1928) ; Lelia S. Kirby. 35 B. T. A. 578 (1937) ; cf. Whitney Realty Co. v. Commissioner,
80 F. (2d) 429 (C. C.A. 6th, 1935), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 663 (1936). But cf. Bedman
Winthrop, 36 B. T. A. No. 49 (1937). Mere corporate dissolutioa generally does not
effect a distribution to the stockholders, J. T. Hatfield, 32 B. T. A. 1 (1935). In the
absence of physical transfer or formal assignment, the stockholders realize income when
the business is taken over by them. S. B. Quigley, 2 B.T.A. 159 (1925); Harry A.
Dodu, 11 B. T. A. 39 (1928). The time when the liquidation distribution was recived
by the stockholder may also be material in determining, for the purpo-es of the capital
gains tax, whether the corporate assets were distr uted in kind to the stockhtolders and
then sold or were actually sold by the corporation. The trustees in liquidation, regardless
of the terms of their appointment, are generally deemed to act for the corporation,
rather than for the stockholders. Taylor Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F. (2d)
108 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931) ; Tazewell Electric Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner, 84 F.
(2d) 327 (C.C.A. 4th, 1936).
92. The Acts of 1924, 1926, 1928, and 1932. See note 15, supra. The Act of 1918
also treated liquidation as a sale of the stock, but contained no option permitting taxation
at the flat rate. See notes 8 and 10, mipra, and text. The 1916, 1917, and 1921 Acts
taxed liquidating and ordinary dividends at the same rate, to the extent of post-1913
earnings. See notes 7, 11, and 12, supro, and text.
93. The acts permitted credits against normal tax for dividends received from
domestic corporations subject to taxation or from foreign corporations whose income
was largely derived from United States sources. Section 216(a), 43 STAT. 272 (1924) ;
§216(a), 44 STAT. 29 (1926); § 25(a), 45 STAT. 902-03 (1928); §25(a), 47 STAT.
184 (1932).
94. See Preliminary Report of Ways and Means Subcommittee on 1934 Act, cited
1 PAUL AND MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 3, 297-298.
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as to liquidation transactions, sought to prevent avoidance of surtax through
liquidating dividends by taxing gain in full at normal and surtax, without
the percentage limitations applicable to the disposition of other capital assets.6
Under this act, since ordinary dividends remained, in general, subject to
surtax only,96 it was' usually more advantageous for stockholders to label
a given distribution of accumulated earnings as an ordinary dividend. 7 Thus,
under all these acts, differences in the rates of tax upon liquidating and
ordinary dividends generated controversy, the determination of which turned
upon criteria often so inconclusive as to foster tax avoidance. In order to
reduce litigation of this character, it would therefore seem desirable that
differences in the respective tax rates should be as far as possible removed.
The 1936 Act represents a step in this direction in that it subjects both
ordinary dividends and distributions in liquidation to normal and surtax
rates."" The result is to make it less material to the taxpayer than before,
whether earnings are distributed to him as an ordinary dividend or in the
form of a distribution in partial liquidation. This is not true, of course, in
the case of "complete liquidation," for here it may still be more advantageous
for the stockholder to treat a disbursement of earnings not as an ordinary
dividend, but as a liquidation, where the percentage provisions applicable
to capital transactions may reduce the amount of gain subject to tax.90
But equality in the tax rates upon distributions in liquidation and ordinary
dividends would by no means put an end to litigation, for other factors may
provide the necessary incentive. The timing of the tax levy upon ordinary
and liquidating dividends is generally different. Thus, if a given distribution
is held to be an ordinary dividend, the tax applies in the year of receipt,
but if it is considered a liquidation distribution immediate tax liability would
depend upon whether or not the distribution exceeded the basis of the stock
involved. Further, the amount paid by a taxpayer for his shares may make
it material to him whether earnings are distributed as an ordinary or liquid-
ating dividend. A stockholder who had purchased shares at a price reflecting
95. See note 21, supra, and text.
96. The 1934 Act granted individuals a credit for normal tax on dividends received
from a domestic corporation subject to income taxation. 48 STAT. 692, 26 U. S. C.
§25(a) (1) (1934).
97. Cf. Comment (1936) 49 HARV. L. REv. 1344, 1348-1349.
9& The Act provides that 100% of the gain "shall be taken into account in com-
puting net income," except in the case of complete liquidation. 49 STAT. 1687 (1936),
26 U. S. C. A. § 115(c) (Supp. 1937). Section 25 does not permit the stockholder a
credit against normal tax of amounts received as ordinary dividends. 49 STAT. 1662
(1936), 26 U.S.C.A. §25(a) (Supp. 1937).
99. Application of the percentage provisions to cases of complete liquidation repre-
sents a change from the 1934 Act, apparently introduced as a concession to the concept
that the stockholder in effect sells his stock to the liquidating corporation. See Klein,
Liquidations under the Revcnue Act of 1936 (1936) 14 TAX MAG. 648. The amendment
seems unfortunate from the viewpoint indicated in the text.
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the accumulated earnings of a corporation might not realize any "capital
gain" from a liquidation distribution, 1' ° but he would be subject to tax
upon earnings distributed by an ordinary dividend. Finally, in any liquida-
tion involving the usual pro rata redemption of shares, there always exists
the possibility of controversy over the question of whether the redemption
figure represents an attempt to take an artificial loss or a conveniently small
gain.10 1 A return to the theory of the 1921 Act'0 2 constitutes perhaps the
best way of reducing such litigation to a minimum, since this Act eliminated
as far as possible differences in the tax treatment of liquidation distributions
and normal dividends. Liquidation disbursements, so far as they represented
post-1913 earnings, would then be taxed as ordinary dividends, and the
totals of all other proceeds in liquidation applied against the basis of the
stock to determine capital gain or loss. This solution not only ignores the
sale feature of the liquidation transaction, 0 3 but it presents administrative
problems which perhaps more than counter-balance its advantages.204 From
the viewpoint of both taxpayer and government, the task of ascertaining
the "source" of the liquidation distribution which such a provision would
necessitate is always extremely difficult. Moreover, undue hardship might
be imposed upon taxpayers who bought stock at a figure reflecting accumu-
lated earnings of the corporation. Although tax liability upon earnings
distributed as liquidating dividends would theoretically be balanced off by
the eventual capital loss sustained, there may not be enough income in a
subsequent year to permit the deduction of the capital loss. In view of these
considerations, the present act seems to embody the most satisfactory method
of handling liquidation distributions yet adopted by the revenue laws.103
100. I.e., to the extent that the amount distributed in liquidation did not exceed the
purchase price of the taxpayer's shares.
101. See note 84, supra.
102. See note 11, supra, and text; I PAUL AND MEra-s, op. dt. supra note 3, § 8.104.
103. See H. R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (Committee on Ways and Means,
1924) 11; SE.,r. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (Committee on Finance, 1924) 11.
104. See SEN. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (Committee on Finance, 1924) 11.
105. But the 1938 Revenue Bill agreed upon by the Senate and House conferees
apparently provides for a return to the practice of taxing liquidating and ordinary
dividends at different rates, assuming that gains from liquidation are treated as capital
gains. Capital gains upon assets held less than eighteen months are subject to normal
and surtax; but gains from assets held over this period and less than two years are
taxed at a flat rate of 20%; and gains from assets held over two years are taxed at
15%. In the last two cases, taxpayers have the alternative of adding 50% of the gain
to ordinary income. N. Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1938, p. 1, col. 8.
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